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PUNISHMENT BEFORE TRIAL: AN ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
OF FELONY BAIL PROCESSES. By Roy B. Flemming. New York: 
Longman. 1982. Pp. xiv, 175. $20. ' ,t 
Given the constitutionally required presumption of innocence, 1 Ameri-
can pre-trial detention policies depend for their justification on the need to 
assure the appearance of the accused at trial. For many judges setting bail 
for a defendant they believe likely to commit additional crimes pending 
trial, this justification is surely a fiction. And regardless of the reason, con-
finement or enforced expense amount to punishment. In the context of the 
bail system, Roy Flemming refers to this phenomenon as "punishment 
before trial" (p. 2). 
The application of this "punishment," however, varies greatly among 
jurisdictions. Flemming's Punishment Before Trial· An Organization Per-
spective of Felony Bail Processes attempts to explain why bail policies differ 
so markedly from court to court. By focusing on the decision-making pro-
cess and the contextual or environmental factors that influence bail deci-
sions, Flemming has developed an organizational theory that explains why 
courts make the bail choices they do. No other commentator has explained 
the variation in bail policies so completely.2 
At the outset, Flemming notes that the scope and severity of punishment 
before trial varies widely in American courts (pp. 4-5). He reinforces this 
observation by presenting the results of an empirical study of two specific 
court systems, Detroit and Baltimore. Flemming examined the initial bail 
decisions for fifteen hundred felony defendants in each city in 1972 (p. 6). 
Detroit emerged as a "less punitive" city, releasing al1I1ost fifty percent of its 
felony defendants on their own recognizance. In contrast, Baltimore's court 
followed a substantially stricter bail policy. Only twelve percent of the total 
number of defendants received recognizance releases and in those cases in 
which a money bail was set, it was significantly higher.than bail amounts 
set in Detroit for equivalent offenses (p. 9). Flemming seeks to explain 
these differences with an organizational theory of court behavior. 
Chapter two presents the conceptual framework for this theory. Flem-
ming examines the processes by which courts make bail decisions. He dis-
tinguishes between "routine" and "situational" choice modes (pp. 30-33). 
A "routine" bail choice· involves a brief disposition, based exclusively on 
the defendant's prior record and the nature of the alleged offense. The de-
fendant plays no part in the proceedings. Courts with lighter caseloads, 
however, will tend to make their bail determinations pursuant to the "situa-
tional" mode, in which the defendant enjoys a participatory role. The 
l. J. GOLDKAMP, Two CLASSES OF ACCUSED: A STUDY OF BAIL AND DETENTION IN 
AMERICAN JUSTICE 3 (1979). 
2. See, e.g., R. GOLDFARB, RANSOM: A CRITIQUE OF THE AMERICAN BAIL SYSTEM (1965); 
J. GOLDKAMP, Two CLASSES OF ACCUSED: A STUDY OF BAIL AND DETENTION IN AMERICAN 
JUSTICE (1979); R. MOLLEUR, BAIL REFORM IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL (1966); W. THOMAS, 
BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA (1976); B. WICE, FREEDOM FOR SALE: A NATIONAL STUDY OF 
PRETRIAL RELEASE (1974). 
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judge or court officer will question the defendant and consider the truthful-
ness of his responses in rendering the bail disposition. 
While central to an understanding of how an individual court might 
function in setting bail for a particular defendant, this discussion of the 
decision-making process contributes little toward the goal of Flemming's 
work, which is to explain the differences in bail policy between Detroit and 
Baltimore and to show how changes in bail policies might be brought 
about. To understand why bail policies differed so greatly in the two cities, 
Flemming states that the context in which the bail decisions were made 
must be scrutinized (pp. 19-27). The environment in which a court makes 
its bail determinations is the most important determinant of the strictness or 
leniency of its policies. Within this notion of context, the author examines 
the factors of uncertainty, risk, and resources and notes their effects on the 
formulation of bail policy. 
Even though a rational organization attempts to avoid uncertainty in its 
decision-making, "[u]ncertainty is intrinsic to the task of making bail deci-
sions" (p. 19). Uncertainty can manifest itself in various ways. For exam-
ple, if the court faces a defendant about whom it has limited information, 
classification of the defendant as either "good" or "bad" involves an ex-
tremely uncertain determination. Misclassification of a defendant as 
"good" results in the possibility that the defendant may not appear for trial 
or may commit a crime while free. Because courts act to avoid uncertainty, 
courts with limited information tend to detain defendants before trial to 
reduce the possibility of uncertain outcomes. 
Flemming also believes that risk plays a major role in bail decisions (pp. 
21-23). The public may scold or even sanction a judge or court official for 
making a bail decision that "backfired." An elected official even runs the 
risk of defeat at the polls for his bail decisions. Thus, those who make bail 
determinations attempt to minimize the risk of sanctions by adhering to 
public political sentiment. 
Flemming also views resources - especially the detention capacity of 
jails - as a critical factor influencing bail policy {pp. 24-27). Without the 
facilities to hold pretrial detainees, punishment before trial could not exist. 
Conversely, excess jail capacity permits courts to pursue more restrictive 
bail policies, detaining a greater percentage of defendants awaiting trial. 
This examination of the contextual factors that influence bail decisions 
is the most significant contribution of Flemming's study. Differing contexts 
explain the differing bail policies in the two subject cities. It is important 
for attorneys to know that while the particular defendant and the accusa-
tions against him will influence the bail determination, the overall possibili-
ties for release depend upon the political and institutional context in which 
the court acts. Flemming's model illustrates that bail decisions are substan-
tially the result of factors beyond the courts' control; therefore, attorneys 
may be powerless to win favorable dispositions for their clients. Because the 
extent of pretrial sanctioning is so dependent on the existing political cli-
mate, Flemming confirms that political power is critical to effectuate bail 
reform. 
After developing his organizational theory, Flemming uses it to explain 
the differing bail policies existing in Detroit and Baltimore in 1972. Despite 
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Detroit's high crime rate dating back to the 1967 riots, the Detroit courts 
engaged in a surprisingly low amount of pretrial detainment (pp. 42-73). 
One of the explanations Flemming offers for this phenomenon is Detroit's 
political climate in 1972 (pp. 43-53). The court system had committed 
grave injustices against accused criminals during the riots. Most of these 
felony defendants were black. As the black population gained political ef-
fectiveness, it expressed its dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system. 
Since the judges who made the bail decisions were elected officials, they 
responded to public pressure for the increased use of recognizance releases. 
Detention resources also played a significant, if not the preeminent, role 
in shaping Detroit's bail policies. Overcrowded jails (p. 63) sparked public 
pressure to alleviate the inhumane conditions (p. 66). When a Circuit 
Court decision placed a legal maximum on the jails' population, affirmative 
steps had to be taken to alleviate overcrowding. The Detroit courts were 
forced to adopt a bail policy which freely utilized recognizance releases (p. 
68). 
In contrast, stringent bail policies characterized the Baltimore courts 
(pp. 76-114). This is curious because Baltimore possessed one of the coun-
try's most permissive bail rules.3 Flemming makes the important discovery 
that bail reform does not necessarily liberalize the conditions of release (pp. 
80-83). Change is impossible without the requisite political power. Balti-
more's conservative political climate superseded the statutory reforms and 
prevented change (pp. 77-78). Both the public and police were leery of de-
fendants out on bail because two police officers had recently been killed by 
released defendants (p. 80). Further, the commissioners who made the bail 
decisions were extremely vulnerable to both criticism and dismissal by their 
superiors; thus, the commissioners were inclined to be strict with defendants 
and minimize the risks associated with making the wrong decision (pp. 83-
86). In sum, the environment surrounding the Baltimore courts in 1972 did 
not permit a lenient bail policy. 
Despite this contribution to the study of bail, Flemming's work is not 
free of defects. First, his heavy reliance on statistical data is often confus-
ing.4 Readers lacking some background in statistics may find the terminol-
ogy and the significance of various tables and figures hard to follow. Also, 
long discussions often lead to obvious ccnclusions. For example, Flemming 
states that ''the scope of pretrial punishment narrows as the frequency of 
recognizance releases increases." Similarly, after a lengthy discussion, 
Flemming concludes that the amount of a cash bail is directly related to the 
severity of the charge. Neither of these observations merits the attention the 
author pays them. Finally, Flemming's use of ten-year-old data is bother-
some and taints the credibility of his results. It is difficult to authenticate 
3. Rule 777: "Any defendant charged with an offense not punishable by death shall, at his 
appearance before a judicial officer, be ordered released pending trial on his personal recogni-
zance unless the officer determines that such release will not reasonably assure the appearance 
of the defendant as required." This rule carried a presumption that felony defendants would 
be released on their own recognizance. P. 8. 
4. See, e.g., p. 10 (utilizing "multiple correlation coefficients" to compare the severity of 
punishment in Detroit and Baltimore courts). 
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his explanations of the significant environmental influences facing the 
courts. 
In the end, however, the problems are small compared to the task un-
dertaken. Flemming provides perceptive analysis of an integral part of the 
criminal justice system. For the undertaking - as well as the results - he 
deserves praise. 
